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Web Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. See the proof of Lemma 2 in the web-appendix for DeMarzo, Kremer,
and Skrzypacz (2005).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose for a moment that k is a continuous variable. If we prove
that the lemma holds for any k, this will automatically imply that it holds for k taking
values 0;1;2;:::. First, let us prove that V (k) is an increasing and concave function of k.
Di®erentiating V (k),




































































1. Also, logF (v)
¡2
k + logF (v)
¢
is positive for v < F¡1 ¡
e¡2=k¢
and negative for v > F¡1 ¡
e¡2=k¢
.
Hence, V 00 (k) < 0.
In a similar way, we can prove that Ub (v;k;S) is decreasing and convex in k. Write
1Ub (v;k;S) as
(B1) Ub (v;k;S) =
Z v
vL



































· 0 for any v, because logF (y) is an increasing












= 0. Also, s(y;S) is increasing in y by

















Note that logF (y)
³
2
k¡1 + logF (y)
´
is positive for y < F¡1 ¡
e¡2=(k¡1)¢
and negative for


























¸ 0 for all v. Combining this with the fact that
s(y;S) is increasing in y, so v ¡ ES (s(y;S);v) is decreasing in y, yields Ub
kk (v;k;S) > 0.













qk¡1 (1 ¡ q)









































































































qk¡1 (1 ¡ q)
nb¡k sum to one over k,

















Moreover, the terms of this sum are negative for k < q (nb ¡ 1) + 1 and positive, otherwise.
Because it immediately follows from Lemma 2 that Ub (k;S) is a decreasing function of k as
an expectation of Ub (v;k;S) with respect to v, the ¯rst term of (B7) is negative. By the





decreasing function of q. Combining this with (B5) and (B6), we conclude that there exists a
unique solution to (11). This proves part (a) of the lemma.
If S1 is a steeper set of securities than S2, Ub (k;S1) < Ub (k;S2) for any k > 1 with equality
for k = 1. This is because the total surplus is una®ected by the choice of security design, and
the seller's revenues are higher when the security design is steeper. Thus, an increase in the




. Similarly, an increase in


















if S or ~ S is altered. This implies parts (b) and (c) of the lemma. To
prove part (d), notice that q = 1
ns is the solution of (B4) when S = ~ S.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider an ordered set of securities S 6= Scall and r such that
vr > vL. Because S 6= Scall and vr > vL, we can reduce r by an in¯nitesimal amount and
increase the steepness of S by an in¯nitesimal amount so that q (S;r;S¤;r¤) de¯ned by (19)
does not change. The latter can be done, for example, by taking an ordered set of securities,
in which for s 2 [sL;sH] each security with index s is a linear combination of a security in S
with the same index and the corresponding security in Scall. From (20) and Vr(k;r) < 0 we
conclude that Us (S;r;S¤;r¤) increases and the described deviation is pro¯table, so any reserve
price r such that vr > vL cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Finally, consider an ordered set
of securities S 6= Scall and r such that vr · vL. If S is not an equilibrium security design of the
main model, then a pair (S;r) is not an equilibrium of the extended model, because the same
deviation that is pro¯table in the main model is also pro¯table now. If S is an equilibrium
security design in the main model, then a pair (S;r) is an equilibrium in the extended model.
This is because any deviation to (S0;r) for S0 6= S is not pro¯table as it is not pro¯table in
the main model, and any deviation to (S0;r0) for r0 such that vr0 > vL is not pro¯table as it is
worse than a deviation to (S00;r00), where r00 = r0¡" for an in¯nitesimal " and S00 is an ordered
set of securities such that q (S00;r00;S;r) = q (S0;r0;S;r).
Proof of Proposition 6. By analogy with (7) { (8), let Ub (vi;k;S;M) and Ub (k;S;M)
denote the interim and ex-ante bidder's expected surpluses from participating in an auction
with k bidders, security design S, and procedure M. As in the main setting, consider a seller
who chooses (S;M), when all other sellers choose
³
~ S; ~ M
´
. For a potential bidder to select
among auctions using mixed strategies, his expected payo® from choosing all sellers must be
4the same. Hence, the probability of choosing the deviator q
³


























k; ~ S; ~ M
´
:





























k; ~ S; ~ M
´
:
From (B9) we can see that the seller's expected surplus depends on her choice (S;M) only
through the participation probability q
³
S;M; ~ S; ~ M
´
. Thus, we can rewrite Us
³




q; ~ S; ~ M
´
and reformulate the seller's problem in terms of choosing the probability q with
which each bidder decides to participate in the auction. Mathematically, the seller's problem
is
(B10) max
q2[qL(~ S; ~ M);qH(~ S; ~ M)]
Us
³









~ S; ~ M
´
are the lowest and highest participation probabilities the
seller can achieve by altering the security design and auction format. For a given number of
bidders, their expected surplus is the highest when the security design is cash and the lowest
when the security design is call options in both ¯rst-price and second-price auctions (DeMarzo,
Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005)). When the auction is in pure cash, the revenue equivalence
theorem holds. Hence, qH
³
~ S; ~ M
´
= q (Scash;SP) = q (Scash;FP). When the auction is in call
options, the ¯rst-price auction yields higher expected revenues for the seller than the second-
price auctions.1 Hence, qL
³
~ S; ~ M
´
= q (Scall;FP). Therefore, (S¤;M¤) is the equilibrium if
















Compared to (B11) with M¤ = SP, (B12) has the same upper bound on q and a smaller lower
bound on q. Also, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, Us (q;S¤;SP) is a concave function of
q. Therefore, if S¤ 6= Scall, then the fact that S¤ satis¯es (B12) implies that (S¤;SP) satis¯es
(B11). Therefore, (S¤;SP) is the equilibrium pair of security design and auction format.
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